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Only the questions are shown here. 
Written answers are presented in the 
final version of the product design 
paper on CREG’s web site.
How will the aggregate demand 
curve be defined? 
Are LSEs allowed to purchase 
energy in the auction that is not 
required for final customers?
Because 100% of the demand will be 
procured in the MOR auction, the LSE 
will not be required to purchase energy 
in the spot market for regulated 
customers. Is that correct?
We understand that the agents in the 
secondary market will be limited to 
suppliers, as long as the LSEs will not 
have to trade any energy in this market. 
Is that true? 
The proposal is not favorable for the 
supply side, because all the risk is 
assigned to it. As a consequence, the 
implementation of a secondary market 
is suggested. 
Is it correct that the regulated demand 
will be passive in the auction? Will 
there be competitive bidding only on 
the part of the generators (sellers)? 
The secondary market that may 
appear as a consequence of the 
auction will include participation of 
LSEs or only of generators? 
Is it possible that the LSEs, on 
behalf of the demand, to give up in 
an auction? Is it convenient to have 
a reserve price for the auction? 
What will happen if there is not enough quantity 
offered in the auction? Is it possible to assign 
obligations, even if the auction does not have 
enough competition? In that case, will the residual 
demand be exposed to the spot prices? If the 
answer to the previous question is yes, can those 
prices be passed through to the customers. Is it 
possible to include the residual demand in the 
following auction? 
Regarding the 2-year commitment 
period, it is suggested to include also a 
product with a 1-year commitment in 
order to improve risk management. 
In relation to the auction for nonregulated 
customers, the participating agents should 
be who define the products according to 
their own needs. 
Efficient price formation requires active 
participation of the buyers, so the price 
should not be defined completely by 
the sellers. For that reason a double 
auction should be analyzed. 
Buying in a single mechanism (MOR) 
reduces the liquidity of the products 
and the participation in other alternative 
markets. 
Given that supplier participation is voluntary, 
is it possible that in one of the eight 
auctions, some sellers will not participate, 
generating inefficiencies in the price 
formation. 
What would happen with 
deviations in projected 
demand? 
What would happen when a new 
LSE enters the market? How can it 
purchase its requirements? 
There is a five month planning 
period in the last quarterly auction. 
This is considered too short and 
risky. 
Bearing in mind  the energy variability of 
hydropower plants, a couple of agents have 
proposed to analyze the possibility to allow offers 
with different percentages of the aggregate 
demand each month without changing the price 
and commitment period. 
The agents who act as a suppliers  
should be limited to generators in 
order to avoid intermediation costs. 
There has been a misunderstanding about the lot 
size. You have recommended a lot size in the 
following terms: “say 0.1% of regulated load (6 
MW).” This expression has been interpreted as a 
fixed quantity (6 MW) instead of a percentage of 
the demand. It will be desirable to clarify this issue. 
It will be necessary to establish a 
methodology to estimate the projected 
demand. 
Product
Two products, one auction
• Regulated customers (68% of load)
– Small customers without hourly meters
– Passive buyers in auction
• Nonregulated customers (32% of load)
– Large customers with hourly meters
– Active buyers in auction
Regulated product:
Energy share of regulated load
• Supplier bids for % of regulated load
• Supplier that wins 10% share has an 
obligation to serve 10% of regulated load 
in each hour
• Deviations between hourly obligation and 
supply settled at the spot energy price (or 
scarcity price if spot is higher)
• Pay as demand contract
Price coverage
of regulated customer




















































• Participation by LSE is mandatory and 
passive (no active bidding of demand)
• Regulated customer may decide to 
become a nonregulated customer
– Purchase hourly meter
– Actively participate in auction
• But switch to nonregulated status is 
permanent (or occurs after sufficient 
delay)
Nonregulated demand participation
• Nonregulated demand participates in the same 
auction
– Single nonregulated product
• Product: expected energy, not actual energy
– Hourly, but based on expected energy demand
– Hedges expected energy demand, but exposes 
customer to spot price on the margin
– Requires hourly meter (and demand management)
• Participation benefits both regulated and 
nonregulated customers, as well as suppliers






2-year contracts, starting in 
January are most common.
Recommendation:
Quarterly 2-year contracts, annual rolling
Planning
Yr



























at any one time.
Auction
Descending clock auction
• Same as in firm energy auction, but two 
substitutable products
• Bidders can be rationed at the clearing 
price
– Typical case
• A bidder drops from 2.0% to 1.5% at $70/kWh
• Clearing occurs (S = D) at 1.7%. 
• Supplier wins 1.7%.
Descending clock auction
• Auctioneer announces high starting price
• Suppliers name quantities
• Excess supply is determined
• Auctioneer announces a lower price 
• Process continues until supply equals 
demand
Starting price
• Starting price must be set sufficiently high to 
create significant excess supply
• Setting too high a starting price causes little harm
– Competition among bidders determines clearing price; 
high start quickly bid down
• Setting too low a starting price destroys auction
– Inadequate supply or insufficient competition
• Set starting price based on market fundamentals 
and indicative offers from suppliers at min and 
max starting prices
– Min starting price roughly 20% above market
– Max starting price roughly 50% above market
Mechanics
• Clock auction done in discrete rounds
• Two price “clocks,” one for each product
• In each round,
– Auctioneer announces
• Excess supply at end of prior round
• Start of round prices (higher prices)
• End of round prices (lower prices)
– Each bidder submits a supply curve at all prices between start of 
round price and end of round price
– Auctioneer determines excess supply at end of round price
• For each product with excess supply, price increases















Individual Supply Bid, Round 6
• Activity rule
– Bidders can only maintain or reduce quantity as price falls
(upward sloping supply curve)
• “Intraround bids”
– More accuracy without too many rounds
– Better control of pace of auction




















Sample bid illustrating switch and reduction
• Activity rule
– A bidder can only maintain or reduce its aggregate quantity as price 
falls (its aggregate supply curve must be upward sloping)
– Allows full substitution between Reg and Nonreg products
– Bidders can switch or reduce or both at any price point
Carried forward from end of prior round
Set by auctioneer at end of prior round
Bidder's bid in round 2 1
Bidder activity Reg Nonreg Reg Nonreg
Start of round prices and quantities 0.0% $70.00 $68.00 3.0% 2.0% 8.0%
Switches 1% Reg to Nonreg 37.0% $66.30 $64.30 2.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Reduces Reg by 1% 83.0% $61.70 $59.70 1.0% 4.0% 6.0%





Price ($/kWh) Quantity (%)
Information policy
• Demand curve and starting price 
announced before auction
• After every round, auctioneer reports
– Aggregate supply
– Excess supply at end of round price
– End of round price for next round
(determined from extent of excess supply)
Forward energy auction
• Simultaneous descending clock auction
– Two clocks; two prices
– Regulated; nonregulated
• Supplier qualification and credit identical for both regulated and 
nonregulated product
• Regulated demand is mostly vertical (typically a fixed quantity 
purchased in each auction)
• Nonregulated demand is as-bid at qualification
• Suppliers can arbitrage freely across the two products throughout 
clock auction
• Auction ends when no excess supply for either product
– Clock ticks down if and only if excess supply on product
• Any price separation reflects difference in serving regulated load 
and nonregulated load
Administrative demand curve for regulated 














∼ 50% above market price
∼ 40% above market price
∼ 20% above market price
Demand curve for nonregulated product is submitted 












$75 Determined by summing 




• Simple uniform-price auction
– Participants submit demand bids and supply asks for 
each product
– Clearing-price determined from intersection of 
aggregate supply and demand curves
• Regulated and nonregulated products include
– Monthly slice for next 12 months
– Yearly slice for each year already auctioned in 
primary auction
P2 P3 P4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5
Year Month
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 + year 2010
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 + year 2010
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 + year 2010
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 + year 2010
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 + year 2010
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 + year 2010
7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 + year 2010
8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 + year 2010
9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + years 2010 and 2011
10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 + years 2010 and 2011
11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 + years 2010 and 2011
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 + years 2010 and 2011
2009
Primary market products




Secondary market has 13 or 14 
products each of Reg and Nonreg
Handling differences among 
nonregulated customers
• Hourly demand is forecast for each 
nonregulated customer for every hour
• Single nonregulated product
• Rate is auction clearing price scaled by quality 
factor of each nonregulated customer
• Quality factor reflects expected cost difference 
(at spot price) for particular customer
• Each supplier receives its share of payments























Monthly demand and cost for regulated and nonregulated load
5.4 260.3
Avg. Price
Cost is based on spot prices. Spot price ($/kWh) is shown in color.
Simple hourly demand model
• Sample: 1 Jan 2002 to 31 Mar 2007
• Linear growth trend
• Fixed effects for
– Month of year
– Day of week
– Hour of day
Hourly mean and standard 
deviation of demand and cost 
 
Load Actual Fitted Actual Fitted
42.6 3,841 3,841 0.01 171 171 0.03
21.5 908 893 4.45 112 110 1.96
42.6 1,689 1,689 0.02 75 74 -0.09
21.5 275 251 6.89 46 45 3.42
42.6 5,530 5,530 0.01 246 245 0.03
21.5 1,062 1,033 4.39 155 153 2.00
Note: Hourly mean and standard deviation for the period 1 Jan 2002 to 31 May 2007.
Price and cost are in January 2007 Colombian pesos. Cost is based on spot price.
Hourly demand estimate based on fixed effects model controlling for month, day of






Demand  (MWh) Error 
(%)
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Weekday off peak hour (3) in 2006 for Company 3
International experience and grades
• Maryland: F
– Single RFP to procure many years of energy
(all eggs in one basket)
– Poor auction design
• New Jersey: A-
– Annual auction for one-third of load
– Very good auction design
• Illinois: A-
– Nearly identical to New Jersey
• France (Virtual Power Plant auction): A
– Quarterly auctions with flexibility on duration
– Excellent auction design
• Spain: C?
– Process appears too rushed at end
Conclusion
Background












• Reliable price signals based on market 
fundamentals
• Competitive
• Mitigate market power
Transparency
• Offers are comparable
• Clear why winners won
• Prompt regulatory review and approval
• Regulatory certainty
Neutrality
• All suppliers treated equally
• All demanders treated equally
Risk management
• Reduces risk for both sides of market
• Rate stability, yet responsive to long-term 
market fundamentals
• Shields from transient events
• Addresses counterparty risk
Liquidity
• Promotes secondary market
• Liquid market for primary product 





• For system operator
• For regulator
Consistency
• Consistent with other key elements
– Spot energy market
– Firm energy market
• Consistent with best practice in world
Setting
Colombia setting
• Hydro-dominated electricity market
– 80% of energy
– 67% of capacity
– 50% of firm energy (exceptional dry period)
• Hourly bid-based spot energy
– Single zone
• Firm energy market
– Assures sufficient firm energy
– Hedges prices above scarcity price (about $260/kWh)
Note: All $ amounts in January 2007 Colombia Pesos
Market structure of firm energy
(moderate concentration)
Hydro Thermal Total
Emgesa 10,419 2,373 12,792 21% 455
Epm 8,523 3,295 11,818 20% 388
Corelca 9,873 9,873 16% 271
Isagen 5,099 2,327 7,426 12% 153
Epsa 1,487 1,655 3,142 5% 27
AES Chivor 2,925 2,925 5% 24
Gensa 57 2,594 2,651 4% 20
Termoflores 2,189 2,189 4% 13
Termoemcali 1,533 1,533 3% 7
Merielectrica 1,404 1,404 2% 5
Termotasajero 1,349 1,349 2% 5
Termocandelaria 1,062 1,062 2% 3
Proelectrica 708 708 1% 1
Menores 689 689 1% 1
Urra S.A 438 438 1% 1

















































































Take or Pay Pay as Demand
Pay-as-demand is common
Regulated product
• Regulated load is aggregate of all LSEs
• 100% of regulated load is purchased in 
auctions
• Mandatory for LSEs
• Voluntary for suppliers
• Accommodates multiple customer classes 
if required
– For example, undesirable load shape of LSE







































































Average cost ($/kWh) by LSE and Year
1452 9B
Demand







• Costs are about 19% higher in dry season
• Wet season .92; dry season 1.11
• Conclusion: seasonal factor not needed
Load-following not ideal for all
• Different resource types have different ideal 
dispatch
– Baseload, peaker, limited-water hydro, etc.
• Difference in dispatch and obligation introduces 
risk and market power issues
• Problem mitigated by
– Balanced portfolio of resources
– Balanced portfolio of contracts (Reg. and NR)
• Conclusion: benefits of pay-as-demand greatly 
exceed costs
 




























































































CERE (Capacity Charge) MM (Market Average) MM and CERE
IPP (Producer Price Index) SP (Spot Price)
Index multi-year contracts with IPP
Small lot size
• 0.1% of load category (reg. and nonreg.)
– About 6 MW average load for regulated
– About 3 MW average load for nonregulated
– Varies with each hour, since load following
• Great flexibility in expressing quantity
• Accommodates small bidders
• Improves secondary market
Planning period
• Time between auction and start of 
commitment
• Opportunity to make adjustments
• Impacts how much uncertainty has been 
resolved
• Longer implies price stability
• Longer implies more costly guarantees
Commitment period
• Time between start and end of 
commitment; contract duration
• Longer implies price stability
• Longer implies better financing
• Longer implies greater guarantees
Frequency
• Number of auctions per year
Alternative to improve liquidity of 1-year product:
Quarterly 1- and 2-year contracts, semi-rolling
Planning
Yr
Year Qtr 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4


























at any one time. 
1/4 one-year
3/4 two-year
